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We investigate how continental European unemployment can be reduced without reducing 
unemployment benefits and without reducing the net income of low-wage earners. Lower 
unemployment replacement rates reduce unemployment, the net wage and unemployment 
benefits. A lower tax on labour increases net wages and - for certain benefit-systems - 
unemployment benefits as well. Combining these two policies allows to reduce 
unemployment in countries with “net-Bismarck” and Beveridge systems without reducing net 
income of workers or of the unemployed. Such a policy becomes self-financing under realistic 
parameter constellations when taxes are reduced only for low-income workers. 
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Many European countries are still struggling with high unemployment rates. Suﬃciently
many analysts agree on two facts: Unemployment is heavily concentrated among low-skill
individuals and demand for low-skill individuals could be increased by reducing their labour
costs. Labour costs can be inﬂuenced by the government directly by reducing taxes or social
security payments or indirectly by reducing unemployment payments in order to decrease
bargained wages. What should the government do?
The starting point of this paper is a certain concern for income levels at the lower end
of the income distribution. This could be justiﬁed on pure egalitarian grounds, on consider-
ations based on social welfare maximisation (where income uncertainty would require 100%
insurance under risk aversion unless there is moral hazard), on eﬃciency arguments (less
inequality implies less crime; see e.g. Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002)), for a survey)
or on political economy considerations (income eﬀects for the low-skilled or for insiders can
be crucial for the acceptance of reforms, see e.g. Grüner (2002)). Whatever the speciﬁc
reasoning, the question would always be whether unemployment can be reduced without
decreasing the net wage of the low skilled or net beneﬁts of the unemployed. This is the
question of this paper.
While reducing unemployment with higher income for everybody is obviously possible
from a theoretical perspective (with lump-sum taxation, any increase in eﬃciency can be
made Pareto-improving; see Roed and Strom (2002) for a more general discussion in second-
best worlds), can this also be achieved with the existing instruments a typical government
has at its disposal? Could Germany, to provide an example, have implemented labour mar-
ket reforms - diﬀerent from the 2005 Hartz IV reforms - having a more Pareto-improving
spirit? To ﬁnd an answer, we use the simplest theoretical framework which allows to treat
these issues. Our static economy, presented in section 2, produces one homogenous good
by employing high-skill and low-skill workers. Only the low-skilled are organised in unions.2
Unions ration labour and thereby cause unemployment. The government provides unem-
ployment beneﬁts, which ampliﬁes unemployment, and taxes labour. Taxation should be
understood in a broad sense and includes labour taxes per se and social security contribu-
tions. In equilibrium, there will be three groups: the high-skilled, employed low-skilled and
unemployed low-skilled. As unemployment beneﬁts in OECD countries are computed in at
least three diﬀerent ways, we distinguish between institutional setups that can be called
Beveridge system (unemployment payments are wage independent), net-Bismarck system
(unemployment payments are proportional to net wages) and gross-Bismarck systems (un-
employment payments are proportional to gross wages).3
The policy experiments we analyse imply a simultaneous reduction of unemployment
beneﬁts and the tax rate.4 The objectives of the experiments are to (i) reduce unemployment,
2When deﬁning skill by educational level, empirical support for this assumption is fairly overwhelming
(e.g. Schnabel (2002)). See Sørensen (1997), p. 238 for a similar assumption.
3Following OECD (2002, tab. 2.2 and 2.3), Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the USA have
a predominantly net-Bismarck system, Austria, Japan and Portugal have a gross-Bismarck system and
Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and the UK have a Beveridge system.
4The ﬁrst-best policy to restore eﬃciency in our economy would be to abolish unemployment beneﬁts and
trade unions. We take the existence of trade unions as given which, given constitutions of many countries, is
2(ii) keep either the net-wage of a worker or the net payment to an unemployed worker at
its current level and (iii) preserve the current budget balance of the government, i.e. policy
reforms must be self-ﬁnancing. As instruments, we use the tax rate on labour and either the
replacement rate in Bismarck countries or unemployment beneﬁts directly.5 We also vary the
progressiveness of labour taxation. A policy reform that preserves net wages of workers will
be called an equality-preserving reform (EPR), a reform that preservers net payments to the
unemployed will be called ambitious EPR.6 Given our institutional setup, a self-ﬁnancing
ambitious EPR is Pareto-improving. We will therefore use “self-ﬁnancing ambitious EPR”
and Pareto-improving reform synonymously.
Independently of what system we look at, section 3 shows that a reduction in payments
to the unemployed and a contemporaneous reduction in labour taxes reduces unemployment
and keeps net wages of workers at the pre-reform level. Such an EPR can most easily be
illustrated for net-Bismarck systems: reducing the replacement rate increases employment
and both the gross and the net wage fall. As in net-Bismarck systems the labour tax has no
eﬀect on the gross wage, the tax can be reduced such that decrease due to the replacement
rate is just compensated. In other systems, where taxes aﬀect employment, the mechanism
is not as clear-cut but possible in principle. In some cases, depending on parameter values,
an EPR is also self-ﬁnancing.
Needless to say that an EPR generally hurts the unemployed: the reduction in the
labour tax is designed to compensate workers for lower gross wages, the unemployed are
directly aﬀected by the reduction in the replacement rate whose eﬀect on unemployment
payments is usually not compensated for by lower taxation. Decreasing net payments to
the unemployed could be avoided in net-Bismarck systems by reducing taxes on labour even
further. An ambituous EPR would result. It can not be avoided, however, in gross-Bismarck
systems. In gross-Bismarck systems, payments to the unemployed and net wages move in
opposite directions when the labour tax rate is changed. An EPR therefore contradicts an
ambitious EPR - the gross-Bismarck system could therefore be called relatively “distribution
-unfriendly”. In Beveridge systems, an ambitious EPR is possible by reducing the tax on
labour.
When analysing the eﬀects of EPRs and ambitious EPRs in these three systems in section
4, they are self-ﬁnancing only in “rare cases”. EPRs are generally self-ﬁnancing for a larger
set of parameters characterizing the share of skilled workers in the work force and the pre-
a realistic description of reality. For countries where unions play a less prominent role, we believe that our
comparative static results are robust to other reasons for unemployment like eﬃciency wages, insider-outsider
aspects or matching. The justiﬁcation for unemployment beneﬁts comes from some equality considerations
which could be modelled by a social welfare function (see e.g. Atkinson, 2000). We assume here that policy
makers can only undertake “marginal” reforms, given historically grown welfare and tax systems.
5 These are two of the measures which the empirical literature on the eﬀect of institutions on unemploy-
ment uses regularily (see e.g. Belot and van Ours (2004) for a recent contribution and the references therein).
Labour taxes are generally found to have a negative impact on unemployment while the replacement rate is
not always signiﬁcant. The duration of unemployment payments, however, is highly signiﬁcant. As we use a
static model, we view our theoretical replacement rate as a joint present-value measure of the level and the
length of unemployment payments. See the conclusion for further discussion.
6Our objective is to keep welfare of individuals at certain levels that are not aﬀected by some reform. In
an envy-free non-growing world (which we model), this requires constant net income and is independent of
other individuals’ welfare. Hence, we somewhat misuse the term ’equality’ as equality is a relative concept
and we are analysing absolute levels.
3reform tax rate. Ambitious EPRs often require implausible parameter assumptions in order
to be self-ﬁnancing. Policy reforms that are based on broad tax reductions in order to
alleviate net-wage losses following cuts in replacement rates or beneﬁt payments are therefore
diﬃcult to be put in place.
We therefore extend policy options in section 5 by allowing to reduce labour taxes only
for the low-skilled and keeping them at the current level for high-skilled workers. It turns out
that with this way of introducing more progressiveness in taxation, the EPR for net-Bismarck
systems is always self-ﬁnancing and that the ambitious EPR for net-Bismarck systems is self-
ﬁnancing for realistic parameter values. Pareto-improving reforms in net-Bismarck countries
are possible.
As making taxation more progressive does not improve the policy problems in gross-
Bismarck systems, we analyse whether gross-Bismarck systems could be replaced by a net-
Bismarck system without aﬀecting the government’s budget balance, the unemployment rate
and payments to the unemployed (i.e., more generally speaking, without changing the factor
allocation). As it turns out that this can be done by simply adjusting one policy parame-
ter (the replacement rate), the best reform approach seems to be to ﬁrst adopt the most
“distribution-friendly” system, i.e. the system that allows for Pareto-improving reforms,
and then “choose” the desired unemployment rate. Hence, reducing unemployment in a
P a r e t o - i m p r o v i n gw a yi sp o s s i b l ei ng r o s s - B i s m a r c kc o u n t r i e sa sw e l l .
We ﬁnally ask whether our policy proposals preserve existing relative net wages. This
is important as we would like to avoid that incentives to accumulate human capital (even
though not explicitly modelled) decrease. We ﬁnd that in net-Bismarck systems a self-
ﬁnancing ambitious EPR increases, under realistic parameter values, net-wage inequality.
Hence, learning incentives are preserved under Pareto-improving polices.
The paper is related to two strands of the literature. First, it is in the spirit of the liter-
ature which analyses the eﬀects of tax reforms on unemployment in imperfectly competitive
labour markets, see for example Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) who analyse tax progression,
Kolm (2000) who analyses the tax structure in an economy with home production or, more
recently Kleven and Sørensen (2004) who model tax shifts in a dual labour market. All these
models derive employment and welfare eﬀects of fairly sophisticated tax reforms. Contrast-
ing this, our tax reform is simpler, but it is combined with a reform of the beneﬁts y s t e m .
This allows us to achieve multiple objectives: Reduce unemployment while keeping income of
certain groups constant.7 Technically speaking, we undertake a comparative static analysis
under equality constraints. These constraints were not explicitly analysed in previous work.
They are, however, central for many policy makers.
Second, our paper is related to the literature which models proposals that aim at pre-
serving certain minimum incomes without causing too strong eﬃciency losses. Most of these
proposals were developed for countries like the US where the institutional background diﬀers
from Europe. The most well-known is probably the negative income tax (NIT) proposal go-
ing back to Friedman (1962). Its main objective is to provide low-income workers with some
guaranteed basic income without reducing incentives to work.8 An alternative approach is
7Lommerud et al. (2004) discuss optimal taxation when the policy maker is inequality averse. This is
the only goal which tax policy must achieve since there is no unemployment in the economy.
8A less expensive variety of the NIT proposal is the targeted NIT, where only a certain group falls under a
NIT scheme. This could be the long-term unemployed as in Jerger and Sperman (1997) or those participating
4a wage-subsidy to workers or to ﬁrms (for example Snower (1994) or Phelps (1994, 1997)),
known as Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC).9
The NIT or EITC proposals are sometimes applied to continental European countries.
Unemployment could be reduced without increasing inequality, the argument at least im-
plicitly goes, if on the one hand, the institutional background in, say, France, Germany and
Italy is changed, i.e. if e.g. bargaining power of unions is reduced, and, on the other hand,
if wage subsidies or negative income taxes are introduced. Such an approach has several dis-
advantages, however. First, it is politically not credible; individuals proposing a reduction
in union power are typically not those who favour certain minimum net-wage levels. Second,
while some institutions would be removed, new institutions would have to be created (apart
from countries that already have e.g. certain forms of subsidies to low-wage earners). On
a continent caught by many institutional details, this is not desirable. Further, as Snower
(1994) and Phelps (1994) write themselves, these proposals are not necessarily equality pre-
serving and the question of self-ﬁnancing has not been investigated.10 We therefore believe
that it is useful to preserve the existing institutional setup in many European countries and
use existing instruments to reduce unemployment without increasing poverty.11
Af u r t h e ri m p o r t a n td i ﬀerence of our suggestion compared to the negative income tax
proposal is the view about the origins of unemployment. If a certain income is guaranteed
to individuals independently of whether they work, this is generally argued to create un-
employment at the lower wage income as it is not rational for agents to accept a job that
pays lower net income than, say, social welfare payments. While any increase in work incen-
tives at unchanged net-income is desirable, we think that unemployment caused by social
welfare payments is only part of the story. Only about 1/3 of the unemployed (e.g. in
Germany in 2004) had been unemployed for 1 year or more. The majority therefore receives
unemployment insurance payments and we capture this (in our view more relevant) type
of unemployment by rationing eﬀects of union wage setting (which is especially relevant for
Continental Europe).
Finally, the same concern for not reducing the welfare state in an inappropriate way is
shared by Atkinson (2000). He analyses the optimal size and structure of social transfers
when a country is subject to budgetary pressure and labour market shifts against unskilled
workers. He especially focuses on optimal reactions when societies diﬀer in their attitude to-
wards distribution (where examples are labeled “United States” and “Continental Europe”).
We do not employ (diﬀerent cases of) a social welfare function as he does but rather focus on
an EPR or of an ambitious EPR. This can be viewed as examples for what he calls “Rawlsian
government”.
in the labour market as in Van der Linden (2004).
9Both concepts and their implementation in US welfare policy are presented by Moﬃtt (2003). An
analysis of which of these concepts is preferable from an optimal taxation perspective is provided by Saez
(2002). An overview over diﬀerent implementations of the Earned-Income Tax Credit in OECD countries is
provided by EEAG (2002).
10There is evidence that programs that provide tax incentives to increase employment can be self-ﬁnancing
indeed, see Michalopoulosa, Robins and Card (2005). Even though this is micro-economic evidence, it
suggests that the search for self-ﬁnancing reforms on the aggregate level is worth being undertaken.
11Unemployment in European countries is certainly also due to eﬃciency wage aspects. The eﬀect of
low-wage subsidies in such a framework is analysed in Hoon and Phelps (2003), sect. 2.
52T h e m o d e l
2.1 Technology
Imagine an economy where an aggregate technology is used for producing a consumption
good. Factors of production are human capital and labour. The two groups of labour can
be deﬁned according to educational achievement or their labour income. The aggregate
technology is given by
Y = F (H,L), (1)
where F (.) h a sc o n s t a n tr e t u r n st os c a l e . F i r m sa c tu n d e rp e r f e c tc o m p e t i t i o na n dt h e i r
implicit labour demand functions are
FL(H,L)=wL,F H (H,L)=wH, (2)
where gross factor rewards, including taxes and social security contributions, are wH and
wL.
Most of the time, we work with a CES production function. Normalising a TFP measure
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There are two types of households. The high-skill households and the low-skill households.
Labour supply of the high-skilled is determined by utility maximization. Their preferences
are captured by U = U (C,H), where U (.) has the usual properties. The budget restriction
of such a household is (1 − τH)wHH = C.T h e r ea r eLs households that are less skilled and
their preferences depend on consumption only; employment L is determined by unions and
will be presented in the next subsection.12
Utility maximizing labour supply of highly-skilled is determined, apart from parameters,
by net wages only. It can be expressed by an implicit human-capital supply curve ws
H with
the tax on high-skill income and human capital as arguments,
H = H ((1 − τH)wH) ⇔ wH = w
s
H (τH,H). (6)
12An earlier draft had endogenous labour supply of low-skilled in addition to union labour rationing. While
principles remained the same, tractability became much more diﬃcult.
6Assuming a CES utility function of the form U =
³
γCλ +( 1− γ)(T − H)
λ
´1/λ
,w eg e ta












Human capital supply increases in the net wage when 0 <λ<1 and decreases when λ<0.
In what follows, we will always assume an upward sloping supply curve for human capital,
i.e. 0 <λ<1.
With a CD example like U = Cγ (T − H)
1−γ , human capital supply is ﬁx (app. 8.1),
H = γT. (8)
2.3 Unions
Low-skill individuals are organised in unions. Unions operate at the level of a sector or
ﬁrm i. The objective of the unions is to maximize net labour income of its members in
excess of alternative income a worker would earn in case of employment in other ﬁrms or
unemployment. Union preferences can be expressed by (1 − τL)wiLi+Bi [Mi − Li],w h e r ewi
is the gross wage of low-skill workers in sector i and Bi and Mi denote alternative income and
the number of members, respectively. Taking Bi and Mi as parametric, the objective function
can be expressed in the more simple form ui = Li (wi)[(1− τL)wi − Bi]. Maximization
subject to labour demand in sector i similar to (2) yields (app. 8.2) the usual markup of the
net wage over alternative income13,




















Alternative income Bi of workers is given by income from other sectors or from unem-
ployment beneﬁts b when not employed. Assuming identical probabilities for a worker not
employed in i to ﬁnd work in another sector s or to become unemployed, alternative income
amounts to Bi = Σs
j=1 (1 − τL)wj
Lj
Ls +bLs−L
Ls . In a symmetric equilibrium, where every ﬁrm
and every union behaves the same, the alternative income is given by







≡ (1 − τL)wL[1 − u]+bu, (11)
where the second equality deﬁnes the unemployment rate u of low-skilled.
To determine the unemployment rate, we need the wage setting curve of the unions. This
curve shows the wage the unions will set as a function of low-skill employment, hence as a
13This markup expressions requires a labour demand elasticity that is larger than unity, ηL > 1. This is
due to the monopoly union setup. More elaborate approaches to unions than this simple right-to-manage
model exist. Again, we believe that our main results are valid for other speciﬁc a t i o n sa sw e l l .
7function of the overall low-skill labour market situation. Plugging (11) into (9) gives the
general wage setting curve,
(1 − τL)wL =( 1− η
−1
L )
−1 ((1 − τL)wL [1 − u]+bu). (12)
Since the wage setting curve is a function of the unemployment beneﬁt b,w eg e td i ﬀerent
wage setting curves for the diﬀerent institutional settings. They are speciﬁed in the next
subsection.
For later purposes, we compute the demand elasticity ηL for our CES and CD technolo-
gies. When we assume unions to take H as parametric, we compute η
−1
L from the CES
version of (2) and get (app. 8.3)14
η
−1
L =( 1− θ)
β
β +( 1− β)(L/H)
θ. (13)
As 0 <H / L<∞,η
−1
L is bounded by 0 <η
−1
L < 1 − θ. Note that θ<1 from (4). For the
Cobb-Douglas case, the (inverse) labour demand elasticity is (app. 8.3), considering again
H as parametric for the union,
η
−1
L = β. (14)
This is a special case of (13) for θ =0 .
2.4 The beneﬁts y s t e m
T h eu n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁt b in (11) is an important determinant of the alternative income
and therefore crucially determines how the unions set wages. In “Beveridge countries”,
beneﬁts are given by some ﬁxed payment that is not related to the former earnings of an
unemployed,15
bBev = ¯ b. (15)
In “Bismarck countries”, the unemployment beneﬁti saﬁxed fraction of the previously
earned wage. This system can be further diﬀerentiated into whether the ﬁxed ratio is related
to the net or the gross wage. We call these two sub-systems the net-Bismarck and gross-
Bismarck system and specify them as
bnB = ζ [1 − τL]wL, (16)
bgB = ζwL. (17)
14When computing the demand elasticity ηL, we take H as parametric: the union neglects the eﬀects of
its wage setting on employment of high-skilled but does take into account output eﬀects through changes in
employment of low-skilled.
15Clearly, the complexity of the real-world beneﬁt systems are not perfectly reﬂected by (15) to (17).
We believe that our qualitative results on EPRs do not depend on this simpliﬁcation. More quantitatively
oriented future work needs to take the time structure of unemployment beneﬁts into account.
8The wage setting curves we eventually get, when inserting (16), (17) and (15), respec-
tively, into (12), are given by (app. 8.4)



















for the net- and gross-Bismarck and the Beveridge system.
3 Equilibrium analysis of EPRs
We now analyse the unemployment equilibrium in the economy. Market equilibrium for
highly skilled individuals is independent of the unemployment system. It follows from the





3.1.1 The equilibrium system
In addition to the equilibrium condition (21) on the high-skill market, an equilibrium de-
scription requires the low-skill labour-demand equation from (2) and the wage setting curve
(18) for net-Bismarck countries. Reproducing all three equations here gives
FH (H,L)=w
s
H (τH,H),F L (H,L)=wL, (1 − ζ)u = η
−1
L . (22)
This system determines high-skill employment H, low-skill employment L and the gross wage
wL for low-skilled (noting that u ≡ (Ls − L)/Ls by deﬁnition and ηL is either a constant
or a function of H and L - see (13) and (14)). These equilibrium quantities depend on the
replacement rate ζ and the tax τH for high-skill wages. When we study countries that do
not have a net-Bismarck system, the third equation will be replaced by either (19) or (20).
We focus on labour taxation and the replacement rate in our policy analysis. When we
do a comparative static analysis, totally diﬀerentiating gives after some steps (app. 9.1)
dH = −


















































































The abbreviation a1 captures the eﬀect of taxation on the supply of human capital, a2
captures the change of (the inverse of) the wL wage elasticity of labour demand with respect
to employment L. In analogy to η
−1
L in (10), η
−1
H is the inverse of the wH wage elasticity of
human capital demand. The supply elasticity of human capital is denoted by  H.
CD-utility CD-technology general
a1 0 > 0
a2 0 ≷ 0 for σ ≶ 1
 H 0
Table 1 Parameter implications for special Cobb-Douglas cases
Table 1 shows special cases for the above system (22) (that hold for the gross-Bismarck
and Beveridge system as well). When human capital supply is completely inelastic as in (8),
then a1 =  H =0 : labour income does not have any impact on human capital supply. When
the technology is Cobb-Douglas, demand elasticities ηH and ηL are constant and a2 =0 .
Further, the determinant NnB is unambiguously positive.
Generally speaking, the sign of a1 is non-negative (for upward-sloping human capital
supply) and the sign of a2 is positive if the elasticity of substitution σ between factors of
production is smaller than unity and negative for σ>1 (cf. app. 9.1). In general, the sign
of NnB is ambiguous as well. When a2 is not too negative, NnB is positive.16
3.1.2 Comparative static properties
unemployment net wage (1 − τL)wL beneﬁts b
τH CDCD 00 0
general +(1) −−
τL CDCD/ general 0 −−
ζ CDCD ++ +
general +(1) +(1) +(1)
Table 2 : General equilibrium eﬀects of taxation and the replacement rate
(1) An elasticity of substitution σ between H and L smaller than one (i.e. a2 > 0)i sa
suﬃcient condition
16As equation (A.13) in the appendix shows, a2 (θ) is bounded from below. It intersects the horizontal θ
line at θ =0and θ =1 . It approaches plus inﬁnity for θ going to minus inﬁnity. This shows that certain
parameter restrictions would suﬃce to obtain a positive determinant.
10A summary of our results is in tab. 2. It covers the eﬀects of the two policy instruments
beneﬁt replacement rate ζ and taxation τL and τH on unemployment, the net wage and
beneﬁt payments. We focus on two polar cases, the simplest one where both the technology
and the utility function of high skilled are of the Cobb-Douglas type (CDCD) and the general
case. The discussion below covers some intermediate cases as well.
• The eﬀects of taxation
These analytical results are illustrated in ﬁg. 1 which plots low-skill labour on the
horizontal and wages on the vertical axis. It shows the labour demand curve marked by wL,
the corresponding net-wage curve (1 − τL)wL and the beneﬁtc u r v eζ [1 − τL]wL.T h ew a g e
setting curve is the vertical line. When the technology is CD as in (5), a2 =0and (24) shows
that employment is not aﬀected by taxation τL of low-skilled. Even when employment of
high-skilled H changes due to a variation in τH, this only shifts the labour demand curve wL
(and the other two curves below wL)i nﬁg. 1 but not the vertical wage setting curve. When
human capital supply is constant as in (8), due to e.g. a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
a1 =  H =0as well and taxation by (25) does not aﬀect gross wages either. Hence, only net
wages and beneﬁtp a y m e n t sa r ea ﬀe c t e db yt a x a t i o ni nt h i sC D C Dc a s e .
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Figure 1 : The labour market for low-skilled in net- and gross-Bismarck systems
In more general cases for positive a1 and a2, (23) to (25) show that a higher tax τH on
high-skill wages decreases employment of low- (and high)-skill individuals and, due to fewer
high-skilled, also the gross wage for low skilled. The net wage and beneﬁtp a y m e n t st h e r e f o r e
also fall. Note that the negative employment eﬀect for low skilled due to taxation τH results
from the change in the inverse demand elasticity η
−1
L i n( 1 3 )w h i c hi nt u r ni sc a u s e db ya
lower equilibrium human capital stock.17 When a2 is negative (and the determinant NnB
17Lower employment of L, however, moves η
−1
L in the opposite direction as can be seen e.g. from (13).
The overall eﬀect on the position of the wage setting line in ﬁgure 2 remains a shift to the left as could be
seen from totally diﬀerentiating (13).
11still positive), the employment eﬀects for low-skilled change, but the eﬀect on the gross and
thereby net wage and beneﬁts remain unchanged.
While the very weak link between taxation and low-skill employment is clearly due to
the fact that individual labour supply is ﬁx, it stresses the role of institutional arrangements
in explaining cross-country diﬀerences in employment-taxation elasticities.
• Replacement rate
The eﬀects of the replacement rate are more straightforward from (23) to (25). As
long as a2 ≥ 0, a higher replacement rate ζ increases the gross wage, reduces employment
of low-skilled and thereby also employment of high-skilled. The net wage increases and
beneﬁt payments increase because of the increase in the gross wage and directly through the
increase of the replacement rate. With a negative a2, results remain unchanged as long as
the determinant remains positive. Figure 1 illustrates the case of a reduction of ζ and shows
how the shift of the wage setting curve to the right increases employment at lower gross and
net wages.
3.1.3 How to preserve equality
Given the results obtained so far, an employment increasing and equality-preserving tax
reform seems straightforward. A lower replacement rate shifts the wage setting curve to
the right and increases employment at lower gross wages.18 Net wages and unemployment
beneﬁts fall as well, requiring a reduction in labour taxation for low-skilled. If this reduction
is only suﬃciently strong (at the risk of ending up with negative taxation), more employment
goes hand in hand with unchanged net wages or beneﬁtp a y m e n t s .W ed e ﬁn ear e f o r mt ob e
equality-preserving (EPR) if the net-wage does not decrease as a consequence of this reform,
d[(1 − τL)wL] ≥ 0. (28)
We will talk about an ambitious EPR when the reform keeps unemployment beneﬁts un-
changed or increases them,
dbnB = d[ζ [1 − τL]wL] ≥ 0. (29)
• Implementation of the EPR
The equality constraint (28) can best be illustrated by a iso-netwage curve depicted in
the policy space (ζ,τ).19 We assume here that labour taxes are ﬂat, τH = τL ≡ τ.They can
therefore be reduced for human capital and labour only simultaneously. Section 5 treats the
progressive tax case, where only τL is reduced. The iso-netwage curve draws combinations
18Lowering the replacement rate increases employment but not necessarily welfare. While this is well-
understood in models where employment paths are uncertain and unemployment beneﬁts play an insurance
role, this is also true here: A social welfare function that aggregates utilities of the skilled and the unskilled
workers plus the unemployed would require that in a social optimum marginal utilities of the unskilled must
not be too high, i.e. their consumption levels, determined by the replacement rate, must not be too low.
19See Fig. 2 in Atkinson (2000) which also depicts the policy space.
12of ζ and τ where the net wage remains unchanged. By using (25) in (28) gives, assuming
again a suﬃciently large a2, (cf. app. 9.1.2)








wL (1 − ζ)L−1
s + wLNnB
dζ. (30)
As NnB > 0 for a2 n o tt o os m a l l ,t h es l o p eo ft h ei s o - n e t w a g ec u r v ei sp o s i t i v ea n dw e
obtain the following ﬁgure. Note that the concept of these curves is identical to iso-cost or
iso-output curves. While the latter shows by how much one factor of production needs to be
increased at unchanged output when the other factor of production is marginally decreased,
the iso-net wage curve shows by how much taxes need to be decreased at unchanged net
wages when the replacement rate is marginally decreased.
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Figure 2 : Iso-netwage and iso-beneﬁt curves in the policy space
Summarizing, any policy reform that starts from the current policy (ζ0,τ0) lowers net
wages when moving into the non-shaded area. Remaining on the iso-netwage curve keeps
net wages constant and moving into the shaded area increases net wages.
• Implementation of the ambitious EPR
A more ambitious EPR changes ζ and τ such that unemployment beneﬁts (16) do not
decrease. When we compute (29) with (25), we obtain (cf. app. 9.1.2)
dbnB = d[ζ [1 − τL]wL] ≥ 0 ⇔ dτ ≤
[1 − τ]wLNnB/ζ +[ 1− τ]uη
−1
L




wL (1 − ζ)L−1
s
dζ. (31)
Compared to the iso-netwage curve (30), we have an additional term, [1 − τL]wLNnB/ζ in the
numerator. As NnB is positive, however, the slope remains positive and, as the denominator
is unchanged, the slope is larger. This is captured in the policy space in ﬁg. 2 by the dashed
iso-benﬁt line. This means that taxes need to fall faster given a certain decrease in the
replacement rate if beneﬁts are to be kept constant.
Looking again at ﬁg. 1 illustrates why keeping net income of the unemployed constant
is more ambitious than preserving constant net wages: A reduction in ζ not only shifts the
wage setting curve to the right but also the beneﬁtc u r v eζ [1 − τL]wL down. Hence, a
tax-reduction must be much stronger in order to keep ζ [1 − τL]wL at its pre-reform level.
133.2 Policy reforms in gross-Bismarck countries
3.2.1 The equilibrium system
The only diﬀerence between the net- and the gross-Bismarck system is that the wage setting









When we compute the total diﬀerential of the equilibrium condition (21) on the high-skill
market, the low-skill labour-demand equation from (2) and this equation, we obtain for









































3.2.2 Comparative static properties
Again, a summary of our results is provided in the following table. In the text, we do not
explicitly discuss the eﬀect of the replacement rate, as it is identical to the net-Bismarck
case.
unemployment net wage beneﬁts b
τH CDCD 00 0
general + −−
τL CDCD/ general + −(2) +
ζ CDCD ++ +
general +(1) +(1) +(1)
Table 3 : General equilibrium eﬀects of taxation and the replacement rate: the gross-
Bismarck case
(1) As in tab. 2, a2 > 0 is a suﬃcient condition
(2) Direct taxation eﬀect stronger than indirect gross wage eﬀect
• The eﬀects of taxation
In gross-Bismarck-type systems and in contrast to net-Bismarck countries, taxation of
low-skill workers has an employment eﬀect: unemployment increases unambiguously in the
tax rate τL for a CD technology. The reason is the a5 term or the fact that the wage setting
c u r v em o v e st ot h el e f tw h e nt h et a xτL increases. Economically speaking, this means that
higher taxes reduce ceteris paribus the net wage. As, in contrast to net-Bismarck countries,
the alternative income is unaﬀected by tax changes, unions compensate for this loss and move
a part of this increasing wedge on to employers, the gross wage increases and employment
falls.
20We suppress here and in the Beveridge system the expression for H as this is not central in our analysis.
I ti sd e r i v e di nt h ea p p e n d i x .
14The eﬀect on the net wage is therefore ambiguous. On the one hand, the gross wage is
higher, on the other hand, the share that is taxed away is higher as well. Assuming that
the direct taxation eﬀect is stronger than the indirect gross-wage-increasing eﬀect, the net
wage falls due to an increase in taxation. In contrast to this worse situation for workers, the
unemployed beneﬁt from higher taxes as their beneﬁtp a y m e n t s( 1 7 )d e p e n do nt h eg r o s s
wage. As the latter increases due to higher taxes, beneﬁtp a y m e n t si n c r e a s ea sw e l l .
The tax on high-skilled has again no allocation eﬀect as with CD utility, supply of human
capital is ﬁxa n dat a xi sl u m p - s u m .W et h e r e f o r eo b t a i nt h es a m er e s u l t sa si nt a b .2 .
When we analyse tax eﬀects in more general cases, assuming the same restrictions as in
the above given analysis, i.e. NgB being positive and low-skilled and high-skilled labour have
an elasticity of substitution lower than 1, i.e. a2 > 0, (32) shows that higher taxes τL on
labour still unambiguously lead to more unemployment. If taxes rates are ﬂat, τH = τL,a
higher tax leads to an even larger unemployment increase than in the case with invariant H.
With ﬂat tax rates, the eﬀect on the gross wage, however, is ambiguous now, as the a1
term is positive. Obviously, due to the a1 factor, the crucial aspect is played by human
capital supply. With a1 =0 , i.e. ﬁxed H supply, the gross wage and thereby beneﬁt
payments increase. When higher taxes imply lower supply of human capital, demand for
workers shrinks which has a dampening eﬀect on wage demands by unions and thereby implies
moderation of gross wages. The eﬀect on net wages should remain negative, provided again
that the direct tax eﬀect is stronger than the indirect eﬀect.
3.2.3 How to preserve equality
The formal condition for an EPR is identical to (28). The condition for an ambitious EPR
diﬀers from (29), as beneﬁts are deﬁned diﬀerently, dbgB = d[ζwL] ≥ 0. Comparing tab.
2 and 3 shows that the mechanism in gross-Bismarck countries should be expected to be
identical for the net wage. A lower tax increases the net wage, a lower replacement rate
decreases it. At the same time, unemployment shrinks. A ﬁgure similar to ﬁg. 2 (the solid
line) would emerge.
Preserving equality from the perspective of the unemployed is more diﬃcult, however.
As tab. 3 shows, a higher tax τL on labour increases unemployment beneﬁts but, at the
same time, increases unemployment. This is a fundamental conﬂict of interest between the
unemployed and society. Similarly (and for the same underlying reasons as discussed after
tab. 3), a lower tax would lead to higher net wages but would also reduce unemployment
beneﬁts. There is a fundamental conﬂict of interest also between the unemployed and the
employed.
3.3 Policy reforms in Beveridge countries
3.3.1 The equilibrium system
I nB e v e r i d g ec o u n t r i e s ,t h ew a g es e t t i n gc u r v e( 2 0 )i su p w a r ds l o p i n ga n di nt h i ss e n s em o r e
similar to standard labour supply curves, as illustrated in ﬁg. 3. The wage setting curve
approaches η
−1
L for wL going (ceteris paribus) to inﬁnity.
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Figure 3 : The labour market for low-skilled in Beveridge systems
The general equilibrium in Beveridge countries is again given by (21) and (2), where
we now add (20). Policy instruments in these countries are the tax rate and, in contrast
to other countries, unemployment beneﬁts ¯ b (and not the replacement rate ζ). Computing

































































































3.3.2 Comparative static properties
Again, a summary of our results is provided in the following table.
unemployment net wage beneﬁts ¯ b
τH CDCD 00 0
general + − 0
τL CDCD/ general + −(2) 0
¯ b CDCD/ general ++ +
Table 4 : General equilibrium eﬀects of taxation and unemployment beneﬁts: the Beveridge
case
(1) As in tab. 2 and 3, a2 > 0 is a suﬃcient condition
(2) direct taxation eﬀect stronger than indirect gross wage eﬀect
16The eﬀect of policy on beneﬁts in the last column is obvious, given that beneﬁts are
exogenous.
• Taxation
A tax on human capital in the CD utility case is again a lump-sum tax and has no
allocative eﬀect. In the more general case, a higher tax on human capital decreases supply of
human capital and, as a consequence, the marginal productivity of labour. Unemployment
therefore increases and the net wage of low-skilled goes down.
The eﬀect of labour taxes is independent of the speciﬁcation of technology and prefer-
ences. Unemployment unambiguously increases in the tax and the net wage falls. This is
due to the fact that the union will increase its wage demands in both situations.
• Beneﬁts
As (34) shows, higher beneﬁts increase unemployment unambiguously in both CD as well
as general cases. From (35), the gross and thereby also the net-wage increases in beneﬁts.
3.3.3 How to preserve equality
T h eE P Ri sp o s s i b l ea n dw o r k sa sb e f o r e . U n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁts are reduced to ﬁght
unemployment which reduces the net wage. Reducing labour taxes τL reduces unemployment
further and increases the net wage. The ambitious EPR is straightforward: By deﬁnition
of the ambitious EPR, unemployment beneﬁts ¯ b must remain constant. The only policy
instrument that is then left to reduce unemployment is the tax rate τ.A sl o w e rt a x e si m p l y
lower unemployment, a reduction in unemployment without hurting the unemployed requires
lower taxes.
4T o w a r d s s e l f - ﬁnancing reforms
The previous analysis provided suggestions for policy reforms that reduce unemployment
without reducing net income of workers or the unemployed. We did not analyse the eﬀects
of a joint change in the replacement rate and taxation on the government’s budget balance.
Needless to say that this eﬀect is of crucial importance for the political feasibility.
Our proposals are constructed such that they have the potential to be self-ﬁnancing:
Think, for illustration purposes, of a net-Bismarck country. An EPR (and an ambitious
EPR) consists of two components: a reduction in the replacement rate and a reduction in
labour taxation. The reduction in labour taxation decreases tax revenue of the government
while a reduction in the replacement rate reduces government expenditure. The ﬁrst eﬀect
is a negative one for the government budget, the second one is positive. In principle, they
could cancel out.21 Clearly, only a reform that reduces unemployment, that does not reduce
21Note that we do assume (and even show for one example in app. 10.1.2) that we are on the "correct
side" of the Laﬀer curve, i.e. d(τY)/dτ > 0. While lower taxation might lead to more employment, we do
not assume that this increase in employment and the implied increase in tax income would overcompensate
the losses due to a lower tax rate. It is the decrease in the replacement rate and the induced eﬀect of less
spending (leaving more employment apart) that might compensate reduced tax income.
17net-income of any agent and that does not increase the government’s budget deﬁcit is a
Pareto-improving reform.
4.1 Net-Bismarck conditions
Before we give conditions under which our EPRs are self-ﬁnancing in net-Bismarck countries,
we illustrate the approach. It is in its structure identical for all beneﬁts y s t e m s .
4.1.1 The government budget
Policy reforms are self-ﬁnancing when the government budget does not deteriorate due to
the reform. To ﬁnd out whether this is the case, we start from the government budget
constraint, expressed for a net-Bismarck country as
B = τY − bnBU = τY − ζw
n
LU. (36)
The number of unemployed is denoted by U, the net wage by wn
L and taxes are ﬂat, τH =
τL ≡ τ, an assumption to be relaxed again in the next section.
• The EPR condition
When we want to perform an EPR and assume that human capital supply is inelastic,
i.e. the high-skilled have a CD utility function, the equality constraint (28) imposes a certain
relationship between a change in the replacement rate and the tax rate,
d[(1 − τ)wL]=0⇔ (1 − τ)dwL = wLdτ
⇔ (1 − τ)
wL
ζ











When diﬀerentiating, we used the fact that in the net-Bismarck case with equations (2) and
(18), the gross wage is only a function of ζ and not a function of the tax rate as long as human
capital supply is ﬁxed. The equality constraint simply says that when the replacement rate
is decreased, the tax must be decreased as well by the amount (1 − τ)ζ
−1ηζ > 0 to keep the
net wage constant. An EPR is then self-ﬁnancing when the diﬀerential of the government
budget, taking this required decrease in taxation, captured by constraint (37), into account,
is non-negative.
Observing that dwn
L =0 , the diﬀerential of the budget constraint is
















18where we use, similar to above, that in the net-Bismarck case output through labour and
through the gross wage wL is only a function of ζ as long as human capital supply is ﬁxed.





































The eﬀe c to fap o l i c yr e f o r mt h a tc h a n g e sζ and τ on the budget is now a function of the
change in ζ only. The change in τ was replaced by the relationship between dτ and dζ,
imposed by the equality constraint (37). An EPR is self-ﬁnancing when dB ≥ 0 as a result
of dζ < 0. This requires the expression in brackets (.) to be negative.
This equation shows various channels through which a policy reform acts. The ﬁrst two
expressions show the change in income of the government, the last two expressions show
changes in expenditure. An increase (decrease) in the replacement rate increases (decreases)
expenditure because more (less) is paid per unemployed person (given a constant net wage),
the wn
LU term, and because the gross wage increases (decreases), the last term. An increase
(decrease) in the replacement rate also decreases (increases) output and thereby reduces
(increases) tax income, the second term. Finally, given our equality constraint (37), a higher
(lower) replacement rate requires higher (lower) taxation and therefore leads to an increase
(decrease) in tax income, the ﬁrst term. We therefore have three negative terms and one
positive term within the brackets.
• The ambitious EPR condition
If we want to perform an ambitious EPR, we need to replace the iso-net wage constraint
(37) by the iso-beneﬁtc o n s t r a i n t( 2 9 ) ,dbnB ≥ 0. The policy constraint implied by an invari-
ant beneﬁti s




where again, as in (37), the diﬀerential of wL used the fact that in the net-Bismarck case











dζ = ζdτ. (41)
The diﬀerential of the budget (36) now reads instead of (39) dB = τdY + Yd τ− bnBdU
as bnB is constant by policy design. The subsequent steps remain unchanged and we obtain















This means we only ”lose” the term −wn
LUdζ. The economics behind this eﬀe c ti st h a tt h e
governmental budget cannot take advantage of lower payments to the unemployment after
19the reform as was the case in the previously analysed case. But this in turn implies that c.p.
the condition for the funded, ambitious EPR to be successful becomes harder to fulﬁl.



















This equation nicely contrasts the condition for the funded reform to hold in the case in which
o n l yt h en e tw a g eh a sb e e nk e p tc o n s t a n t . F i r s t l y ,t h e r ei sa na d d i t i o n a lt e r mi nt h ep a r t
w h i c hd e p i c t st h er e v e n u ed e c l i n ed u et ot h ed e c r e a s ei nt h et a xr a t e .T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h e
tax rate has to decrease by a larger amount to keep the unemployment income constant than
it was the case in the previous section. Secondly, the expenditure saving eﬀect (depicted by
the second term) is smaller than before. This is because only the employment decrease leads
to less governmental expenditure not the decrease of the unemployment payment as before
(by deﬁnition). Again, an ambitious EPR is self-ﬁnancing, i.e. it is a Pareto-improving
reform, when dB ≥ 0 as a result of dζ < 0.
4.1.2 The EPR
Let us now analyse the EPR condition (40) in more detail for the CDCD case22.W ed e r i v e
in app. 10.1.1 a suﬃcient (and necessary) condition for the tax rate τ and the parameter β
from the CD technology (5) under which an EPR is self-ﬁnancing. This condition guarantees
that the derivatives in (40) are negative, i.e. a decrease in ζ (which decreases unemployment)













Figure 4 Minimum tax rates for self-ﬁnancing
Fig. 4 plots (43) as the thick line in its equality version, i.e. τ =2− β
−1.( W ew i l lr e f e r
to the other lines in what follows.) Parameter combinations which lie on or above the thick
22Here and in what follows we restrict attention to the CDCD case where both the utility function of
high-skilled and the technology are of the Cobb-Douglas type.
20line imply a self-ﬁnancing EPR: The higher the tax rate and the lower β, the more likely
self-ﬁnancing becomes. Note that this condition is independent of ζ and thereby independent
of the unemployment in a certain country.23
This ﬁgure also shows that wage subsidies could also be self-ﬁnancing: if we think of low-
income groups that do not pay taxes and whose social-security contributions are also very
low, one might have to pay subsidies in order to preserve their pre-reform net income. If β is,
say, .2, the tax on labour could become negative and the reform would still be self-ﬁnancing.
Is this condition bounded to be fulﬁlled in practice? The parameter β captures in our
CDCD case both the inverse of the (absolute) demand elasticity of labour, η
−1
L = β from
(14), and the share of labour income going to the high-skilled (5). The demand elasticity
ηL is usually estimated to lie in the long-run at between .4 and .7 (Hamermesh, 1993, p.
272), maybe between .15 and .75 (Hamermesh, 1993, p. 135). This would require in our
speciﬁcation a β larger than unity which, given the production function (5) makes no sense.
We will therefore take the share of high-skill income in total labour income as interpretational
background for β. This share should be smaller than .5 and the condition would then always
be satisﬁed. Given the ambiguity on which interpretation to give for β, we do not put to
much emphasis on this result at this stage.
4.1.3 The ambitious EPR
The condition (42) for the ambitious EPR to hold reads for the CDCD case (app. 10.1.3)
τ>1 −
(1 − β)βζ




T h et h i nl i n ei nF i g u r e4p l o t st h i sc o n d i t i o nf o rζ =0 .4. This value is a rough guess of the
average replacement rate in net-Bismarck countries from OECD (2002, tab. 2.2 and 2.3)
a n dw i t hat a xr a t eo fa r o u n d.2 for the unemployed. What can be seen is that the condition
for the ambitious EPR is, for most of the parameter range of β, more restrictive than the
condition for the EPR. What is worse, the curve never falls below .5. It seems therefore
highly implausible that an ambitious self-ﬁnancing EPR is possible.
4.2 Gross-Bismarck conditions
Let us now derive conditions under which EPRs are self-ﬁnancing when we look at gross-
Bismarck countries. The approach in this case is the same as in the net-Bismarck situation.
When we assume CDCD economies again, we can obtain a condition for the EPR to be
self-ﬁnancing that corresponds to (43). It reads (app. 10.2.2)
τ>2(1− ζ) − β
−1 (1 − 2ζ) (45)
This is similar to the net-Bismarck case. The terms 1 − ζ and 1 − 2ζ shift the curve where
the EPR is just self-ﬁnancing upwards as long as β<1. Its precise position is plotted in ﬁg.
4 for the same ζ as above. Hence, compared to the net-Bismarck system, self-ﬁnancing of
EPRs becomes even more diﬃcult.
23This follows from the fact that the rate of unemployment in net-Bismarck systems depends only on ζ.
21The ambitious EPR is, in gross-Bismarck countries, not so ambitious after all. As tab.
3 shows, a compensation of the unemployed for lower beneﬁts due to a lower replacement
rate ζ requires higher (and not lower) taxes: Higher taxes yield higher gross wages which is
the second component (in addition to ζ) in expression (17) for unemployment beneﬁts. As
a consequence, such a policy would always be self-ﬁnancing as lower replacement rates and
higher taxes both imply more income. As the discussion above has shown, however, such a
policy is strongly against the interest of workers. What is more, as (32) shows, the eﬀects
of such a policy on employment are not clear either. An ambitious EPR does therefore not
appear to be a valid policy option.
4.3 Beveridge conditions
In this section we will analyse the conditions under which an EPR and an ambitious EPR
exist for the institutional setting of a ﬁxed unemployment beneﬁt (i.e. a beneﬁtt h a ti sn o t
related to the wage). This type of setting is very common in the Anglo-Saxon world (but
not in the USA).
4.3.1 The EPR
As tab. 4 has shown, compensating workers for net-wage losses due to lower beneﬁts is again
possible, as in gross- and net-Bismarck systems, by reducing taxes on labour. Computing
simple conditions as in (43) or (45) with respect to self-ﬁnancing is not possible, however,
a st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e( 2 0 )i nt h eU K ,o n c et h ed e p e n d e n c eo ft h ew a g ei n( 2 0 )o nt h e
unemployment rate is taken into account, can only be expressed as an implicit function of τ
and ¯ b. Inserting the gross wage, which is wL =( 1− β)(H/Ls)
β (1 − u)







u = β.We therefore need to solve the condition under
which self-ﬁnancing is just possible numerically (see app. 10.3.1) and obtain the following
ﬁgure.











Figure 5 Minimum tax rates for self-ﬁnancing in Beveridge countries
We see the fat line showing tax rates τ a b o v ew h i c ha nE P Ri ss e l f - ﬁnancing. If the share
β of high-skill income in total income from (5) is low a self-ﬁnancing EPR is possible. This
is qualitatively the same result as with net-Bismark countries as shown in ﬁg. 4.
224.3.2 The ambitious EPR
Given the simple way to implement an ambitious EPR in Beveridge systems (keep beneﬁts
unchanged and cut taxes), it seems obvious that such a reform can never be self-ﬁnancing.
Assuming that an economy is on the left of the Laﬀer curve, any decrease implies lower
government income. At the same time, however, the government saves on unemployment
expenditure as the number of the unemployed decreases. Could the second eﬀect be stronger?
Answering this question again numerically, we ﬁnd a condition that also reminds of
t h ec o n d i t i o n si nn e t - B i s m a r kc o u n t r i e s . T h et h i nl i n ei nﬁg. 5 has the same qualitative
properties as the thin line in ﬁg. 4. Again, it requires higher tax rates for the ambitious
EPR to be self-ﬁnancing.
5S e l f - ﬁnancing reforms
T h ea n a l y s i ss of a rc o n ﬁned itself to identical tax rates for all labour groups. We found that
self-ﬁnancing EPRs and self-ﬁnancing ambitious EPRs are possible only for certain parameter
constellations; in gross-Beveridge systems, an ambitious EPR is not possible at all. This
section therefore studies a more sophisticated policy change and investigates the conditions
under which self-ﬁn a n c i n gi sp o s s i b l ew h e nt a xc u t sa r em a d eo n l yf o rl o w - i n c o m eg r o u p s .
We focus on net-Bismarck systems as countries in Europe with the highest unemployment
problems have these systems.
5.1 Through progressive taxation
One reason for potentially harmful eﬀects on the government budget is the fact that labour
taxation decreases for all groups of labour, whether skilled or unskilled, whether employed or
unemployed. If the objective is to create employment at unchanged net wages or beneﬁts, it
would be enough to reduce labour taxation only for the unskilled. We will therefore analyse
in this subsection the eﬀect of a more progressive tax system.
There are many ways how progressivity of a tax system can be modelled. We use a
very simple one where we reduce the tax rate for low-skilled and keep the tax rate for the
high-skilled unchanged.24 More progression therefore does not mean “taxing the rich” and
“giving it to the poor”. The highly-skilled have the same tax rates before and after the
reform. We will see, however, that high-skilled nevertheless beneﬁt from the reform through
more employment of the low-skilled.
5.1.1 The EPR
I nd e r i v i n gac o n d i t i o nf o ras e l f - ﬁnancing EPR, we follow the steps as in the previous
analysis. The budget is now expressed by B = τLwLL + τHwHH − ζwn
LU, where τH is
constant. After various steps (cf. app. 11.1), we obtain as a condition, comparable to (43)
above,
τH > 1 − u − β
−1. (46)
24While this is in a modelling sense simply a skill-speciﬁc linear tax schedule, it is intended to reﬂect rising
marginal tax rates in a world with many skill groups.
23As β is smaller than unity, this condition is always satisﬁed. Illustrating it as the thick line
for ζ = .2 gives ﬁg. 6. A reduction in the replacement rate can always be accompanied
by a reduction in taxation for low-skilled such that net wages remain unchanged and the
government deﬁcit is not increased. A self-ﬁnancing EPR is possible with more progressive
taxation.
Figure 6 Self-ﬁnancing conditions for an EPR and for ambitious EPRs
5.1.2 The ambitious EPR
Let us now analyse whether keeping net beneﬁts constant can more easily be achieved as
well when only taxes for low-skilled are reduced. We obtain as our new condition (app. 11.1)
τH > (1 − u)
µ






−1 (τL + ζ (1 − τL)). (47)
This condition is plotted in ﬁg. 6 three times as the thin lines with a pre-reform tax for
labour of τL = .4. The line to the left is obtained for ζ = .6, t h eo n ei nt h em i d d l eh a sζ = .4
and the one to the right has a ζ of .2. We see here again that a self-ﬁnancing ambitious EPR
is indeed more diﬃcult to implement than an EPR, as it requires a larger pre-reform tax
than a self-ﬁnancing EPR. For shares β of high-skill income in total labour income that are
low, τH needs to be suﬃciently large for self-ﬁnancing to work. If, however, β is larger than
.5, self-ﬁnancing ambitious EPRs are possible as well. Put diﬀerently, the net-Bismarck
system is more “distribution-friendly” than the other systems. Eﬃciency gains obtained
through lower replacement rates can be distributed by using the existing tax system among
all economic agents such that policy reforms do not only create eﬃciency gains but are even
Pareto improving.
5.2 Reform of systems
The results on progressive taxation shows that the net-Bismarck system is relatively “distribution-
friendly”. We have seen previously that the gross-Bismarck system excludes by design an
ambitious EPR. Obviously, beneﬁts y s t e m sd i ﬀer in their implicit distributional properties.
24We therefore ask whether a country that wants to reduce unemployment without in-
creasing inequality could ﬁrst adopt the net-Bismarck system and then perform the desired
reforms. If one wants to convince a government (having, say, a gross-Bismarck system) to
adopt a net-Bismarck system, one should make sure that crucial properties of the econ-
omy adopting the new system do not change: First, the unemployment rate should not
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w which, by con-
struction, is the same. Hence, replacing one system by another is straightforward without
changing equilibrium properties of the economy. As a simple adoption of the net-Bismarck
system by Beveridge countries an vice versa is possible as well, Pareto-improving unemploy-
ment policies work best when ﬁrst adopting the most distribution friendly system and then
implementing the right reform measures.
5.3 Are incentives right?
The purpose of our policy proposal is to decrease unemployment without changing the ab-
solute situation of the low-skilled or the unemployed, respectively. Thus, we implement a
“policy vector” (ζ,τL) that either leaves the low-skill wage constant or even increases it.
One could be tempted to argue that this gives rise to a long-run incentive problem in the
economy. If the policy proposal decreases the net high-skill wage at invariant low-skill wages,
the incentive to invest into skill-formation will decline. This would distort the long-run evo-
lution of the economy in an unfavourable way. Although these dynamic considerations are
not modelled in this paper, we analyse whether our policy could generate these disincentive
eﬀects. We therefore analyse the eﬀects of our policy proposal on the relative net wage
(1 − τH)wH/[(1 − τL)wL].
In the EPR case, the net wage (1 − τL)wL is constant by construction and the tax on
wH is also held constant in the tax progression case. The gross wage for high-skilled wH goes
up as higher employment increases the marginal productivity of human capital. Hence, in
this case, incentives to invest in human capital are even improving.
In the ambitious EPR case, relative wages can be expressed by ζ (1 − τH)wH/[ζ (1 − τL)wL].
A tax-progression policy reform keeps the denominator constant and changes ζ and wH. The
change in the relative net wage is therefore
d
ζ (1 − τH)wH
ζ (1 − τL)wL
=
1 − τH
ζ (1 − τL)wL






Apparently, an ambitious EPR does not decrease the net wage ratio if the elasticity of
gross wages for human capital with respect to the replacement rate is larger than minus one.
Intuitively, one would expect this elasticity to be negative: A higher replacement rate implies
lower employment of low-skilled which decreases marginal productivity of high-skilled. The
question is, how strong the reaction of high-skill wages to low-skill unemployment is.
25Let us now look again at the CDCD case. We analyse the net-Bismarck system as it
has turned out above that it is the most appropriate for Pareto-improving unemployment











A st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei sb e l o w5 0 % ,u/(1 − u) < 1. The replacement rate in net-
Bismarck countries is around .5 and therefore ζ/(1 − ζ) ≈ 1. As 1 − β<1 as well, we




dζ > −1 such that even the ambitious
EPR keeps incentives for human capital investment in place.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Can a reduction in unemployment originating from a reduction in the replacement rate or
unemployment beneﬁts be accompanied by changes in the tax system such that a reduction
of net income of low-income groups can be avoided? Two versions of constant low-income
are considered: On the one hand, we ask under which conditions an equality preserving
reform (EPR) can be implemented, i.e. a policy reform that reduces unemployment without
reducing the net-wage of low-skill workers. On the other hand, we analyse ambitious EPRs,
i.e. policy reforms that also reduce unemployment but keep net-income of the unemployed
constant. We show that EPRs are possible in all institutional setups considered here (net-
and gross-Bismarck and Beveridge systems). Ambitious EPRs, however, can be implemented
only in net-Bismarck and Beveridge systems. In this sense, the gross-Bismarck system is not
“distribution friendly”.
When analyzing the budgetary requirements for the government, we ﬁnd that EPRs
are self-ﬁnancing for some parameter constellations. Ambitious EPRs, however, are hardly
self-ﬁnancing. The budgetary cost implied by the reduction in labour taxes required to
keep income of the unemployed at their pre-reform level are just too high and can not be
compensated by lower expenditure due to the reduced number of unemployed.
We therefore analyse the eﬀect of reducing tax rates only for low-income workers. This
implies a more progressive tax and social security contributions system and makes EPRs
under net-Bismarck systems always self-ﬁnancing. Ambitious EPRs also become much more
likely to be self-ﬁnancing - Pareto-improving unemployment reductions are possible. We
further show that it is possible for countries to switch from one beneﬁts y s t e mt oa n o t h e r
relatively easily without aﬀecting the unemployment rate and public budget balances. This
would allow countries to ﬁrst adopt the most distribution friendly beneﬁts y s t e ma n dt h e n
perform reforms that reduce unemployment. Finally, incentives to become skilled are not
distorted by more progressive tax systems - the ratio of net wages should actually increase
when policies are implemented that reduce unemployment and keep net income of the unem-
ployed constant. Eﬃciency gains through lower unemployment can therefore be distributed
within existing system such that everybody beneﬁts from these eﬃciency gains.
One can think of various extensions of our approach. While we did show that self-
ﬁnancing ambitious EPRs and EPRs are possible in principle, more complex models than
the ones we used are required before reliable policy recommendations can be made. One
26would need models that allow for serious calibration (as e.g. Sørensen, 1997) and detailed
comparison of e.g. real world unemployment rates and those predicted by the model. Other
forms of unemployment than trade union unemployment would be required for countries
where trade union density is not so high.
Modelling the duration of unemployment would be very interesting as well (for a recent
excellent overview and analysis, see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2002). Given that the replace-
ment rate is not always a highly signiﬁcant determinant of unemployment in empirical work
(see footnote 5), the joint eﬀect of the length of unemployment payments and of the re-
placement rate on unemployment could be better understood. From a policy perspective,
a dynamic approach would allow to jointly analyse negative income tax features and the
measures we propose.
These more elaborate models could then be used to see quantitatively by how much
taxes must fall in order to keep net income of various groups constant and by how much and
how fast (in a dynamic setup) the contemporaneous decrease in the replacement rate would
aﬀect unemployment. One could also investigate how endogenous labour supply decisions of
unskilled workers or the eﬀect of additional taxes help to fulﬁll the self-ﬁnancing objective.
If there was a, say, value-added tax in our model, less unemployment would cause higher
tax income directly because of higher employment (this channel is included in our analysis)
but also indirectly because of higher consumption and the implied value-added taxes. This
should generally allow to design self-ﬁnancing reforms more easily.
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